Stochastic atomic congestion games: Price-of-Anarchy and convergence for large games

Categoria
Incontri
Data
2019-03-08 11:00
Luogo
dipartimento di Matematica, aula consiglio VII piano

Si avvisa che in data 8/3/2019, alle ore 11:00 , presso Sala del Consiglio 7° piano, nell'ambito delle iniziative della sezione di Analisi, si svolgerà il seguente seminario:

 

Titolo: Stochastic atomic congestion games:  Price-of-Anarchy and convergence for large games

Relatore: Roberto Cominetti, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez

Abstract:

We consider atomic congestion games with stochastic demand in which each player participates in the game with probability p, and incurs no cost with probability 1-p. For congestion games with affine costs, we  provide a tight upper bound for the Price-of-Anarchy as a function of p, which is monotonically increasing  and converges to the well-known bound of 5/2 when p converges  1. On the other extreme, for p? 1/4 the bound is constant and equal to 4/3 independently of the game structure and the number of players. For general costs we also analyze the asymptotic convergence of such games when the number of players n grows  to infinity but the probability tends to zero as  $p_n=\\lambda/n$, in which case we establish the convergence towards a Poisson limit game. In a different approach where the weight of the players tend to zero, we find that the limit yields a Wardrop equilibrium for a corresponding nonatomic game.

 
 

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  • 2019-03-08 11:00

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